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Abstract 
The objective of the article is to assess some of the sub-claims that emerge from 
Baxi’s thesis on an emergent trade-related market-friendly human rights paradigm in 
the light of the available evidence regarding the intense contestations and 
confrontations that have occurred between Nigeria’s politically and economically 
transitional Obasanjo regime and a local labour-led coalition.  The piece sets out to 
ascertain the contextual and localised validity of these ‘Baxian’ sub-claims, within the 
wider context of the government vs. labour confrontations in Nigeria during the neo-
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1. Introduction 
 
In The Future of Human Rights,1 Upendra Baxi developed a germinal thesis on the 
steady supplanting in our time of the paradigm of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDH) by an emergent trade-related market-friendly human rights (TREMF) 
paradigm. In a subsequent contribution, Baxi ably applied this thesis to his analysis of 
the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights Norms formulated under the 
auspices of the (now defunct?) UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights.2 As stated by Baxi himself, his overarching TREMF thesis is that: 
 
‘The paradigm of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is being 
steadily, but surely, supplanted by that of trade-related, market-friendly 
human rights. This new paradigm seeks to reverse the notion that 
universal human rights are designed for the attainment of dignity and 
well-being of human beings and for enhancing the security and well being 
of socially, economically and civilisationally vulnerable peoples and 
communities.’3 
 
In my own view, a number of related sub-claims are embedded in Baxi’s overarching 
thesis. These sub-claims will be isolated and discussed in the next section.  
 
The objective of the present enquiry is to assess some of these sub-claims in the light 
of the available evidence regarding the intense contestations and confrontations that 
have occurred between Nigeria’s politically and economically transitional Obasanjo 
regime and a local labour-led coalition (between 1999 and 2005). The paper is 
organised into four main segments; this introduction, section 2, which provides a 
more detailed explication of the particular sub-claims of Baxi’s “TREMF thesis” with 
which we are concerned in this paper. Section 3 provides a description and analysis of 
the character of the contestations and confrontations over socio-economic reforms that 
have characterised government/labour relations during Nigeria’s post-1999 economic 
and political transition. And to conclude, section 4 offers an assessment of the 
explanatory power of the Baxian thesis in relation to the Nigerian evidence.  
 
This will of course not be the first work to directly draw upon and benefit from Baxi’s 
influential work on the relationship between the current iteration of globalisation, and 
human rights. Baxi’s thesis has already been applied most notably by Anthony Anghie 
in his own important historical work on globalisation, human rights and the third 
world.4 However, this paper seeks to make a modest contribution to the relevant 
debates by applying Baxi’s TREMF thesis to a specific Nigerian context that is in 
many ways allegorical of government/activist relations within most third world 
countries. 
 
2. On the Nature of the Baxian TREMF Thesis 
 
In the course of fleshing out his thought-provoking TREMF thesis, Baxi developed a 
number of distinguishable but intimately related sub-claims. Only some of these sub-
claims concern us here. The first such sub-claim is that the emergent TREMF 
paradigm (unlike the UDH paradigm) insists on promoting and protecting the 
collective human rights of various formations of global capital mostly at the direct 
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expense of human beings and communities.5 The distinctive quality here is Baxi’s 
notion of the assignment of human (as opposed to ordinary legal) rights to various 
formations of global capital. To Baxi, the UDH paradigm differs from the TREMF 
paradigm in this way because although the UDH did make provision for a right to 
property that can be read to benefit any person (including presumably corporations 
and business associations), in the end the notion of property in the UDH is itself left 
substantially unsettled.6 On the other hand, the TREMF paradigm makes the 
protection of the property interests of various formations of global capital central to its 
conception of the global social order. What is more, none of the two legally binding 
human rights covenants (the international covenant on civil and political rights and its 
sister covenant on economic, social and cultural rights), which – alongside the UDH – 
constitute the so-called international bill of rights, make provision for property 
rights.7 Thus, to Baxi, “to say that the [TREMF paradigm]…is just an unfoldment of 
the potential of [the] UDHR is plainly incorrect.”8 
 
The second sub-claim is that, much more than in the past, the progressive state – or at 
least the progressive ‘Third World’ state – is now conceived as one that is a good host 
state to global capital; as one that protects global capital against political instability 
and market failure, usually at a significant cost to the most vulnerable among its own 
citizens; and as one that is in reality more accountable to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) than to its own citizens. According to this 
TREMF mindset, progressive states are those states that are much more soft than hard 
toward global capital.9  
 
The third Baxian sub-claim is that the new global order also requires the reproduction 
of a core of internal hardness within these same generally soft states. Thus, to 
paraphrase Baxi, a progressive state is also conceived under the TREMF paradigm as 
a state that is market efficient in suppressing and de-legitimating the human rights-
based practices of resistance of its own citizens and that is also capable of unleashing 
(and, when necessary, does in fact unleash) a reign of terror on some of its citizens, 
especially those of them that actively oppose its excessive softness toward global 
capital.  
 
The fourth such sub-claim is that unlike the UDH paradigm, the TREMF paradigm 
denies a significant redistributive role to the state.10 In fleshing out this fourth sub-
claim, Baxi argues that the UDH paradigm which ‘assigned human responsibilities to 
states…to construct, progressively and within the community of states, a just social 
order, national and global, that will at least meet the basic needs of human  beings,’ is 
being pushed aside to a worrisome extent by a TREMF paradigm that in contrast 
‘denies any significant redistributive role to the state; calls upon the state [and world 
order] to free as many spaces for capital as possible, initially by pursuing the three-Ds 
of contemporary globalization: deregulation, denationalization, and disinvestment.’11 
  
These are the sub-claims the contextual and localised validity of which will to some 
extent be ascertained in this paper. This will be done through a case study of recent 
government/labour confrontations over socio-economic reforms in Nigeria (1999-
2005). To this end, the next section will focus on describing and analysing the nature 
of this government/labour confrontation. Emphasis will be placed on a discussion of 
the nature of the controversial reforms; the labour-led mass resistance to a key aspect 
of these reforms; the government’s heightened repressive stance toward such 
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resistance efforts; and the relative acquiescence – or at least studied ignorance – of 
key international actors in relation to the government’s repressive behaviour. 
Following this next section, the TREMF thesis will be situated within this specific 
Nigerian context and evaluated for its explanatory power in relation to that 
environment.   
 
3. The Government/Labour Confrontation in Nigeria (1999-2005) 
 
3.1. Neo-Liberal Socio-Economic Reform and Massive Fuel Price Hikes 
Substantially in line with the earlier structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that had 
been implemented in Nigeria and pursuant to the requirements of its latest IMF, WB 
and USA/EU inspired and backed socio-economic reform plan, the Obasanjo-led 
Nigerian government has since 1999 embarked on a program of state deregulation, 
denationalisation and disinvestment.12 Sold as a ‘home grown’ set of policies,13 the 
main thrust of the current reform program was the removal of ‘subsidies’ on 
petroleum products (leading inexorably to massive fuel price increases), the 
retrenchment of about 40 percent of the staff of the federal civil service 
(euphemistically referred to as ‘rightsizing’), and the privatisation of state controlled 
enterprises (leading in most cases to denationalisation and the creation of an economic 
bonanza for a tiny cabal).14 This reform program is most notably stated (or perhaps 
re-stated) in the so-called NEEDS Document.15 In line with the dominant orthodoxy, 
this reform program has often been touted by the Obasanjo regime and its 
international backers as the solution to Nigeria’s socio-economic woes.  
 
While several contentious issues can be discerned from the above description of the 
Nigerian government’s reform program, the main focus of this government/labour 
confrontation during the 1999 to 2005 period under examination has been the rapid 
skyrocketing of motor vehicle fuel prices in Nigeria.16 As one of the three central and 
inextricable components of the government’s reform program, cumulatively massive 
and separately substantial increases in fuel prices have over the last few years been 
implemented by the Obasanjo regime. Between May 1999 and August 2005, fuel 
prices were hiked by a steep total margin approaching a whopping 250 percent or so, 
bringing Nigerian fuel prices virtually in line with the prices that currently apply in 
many of the far richer developed countries. Yet, by the Obasanjo regime’s own 
acknowledgement, the vast majority of the Nigerian population (over 70 percent by 
most accounts) now live below the poverty line.17 What is more, as Lagos State 
Governor Ahmed Bola Tinubu has said, most Nigerians seemed to be worse off in 
2005, after six years of formal democratic rule by the Obasanjo regime, than they 
were before 1999, when they were ruled by various military juntas. In the Governor’s 
own words: 
 
“…the level of poverty in the country today is…unacceptable …There is 
nothing more heart-rending than hearing the teeming masses of our people 
cry daily that they are worse off economically and socially today than they 
were before the democratic restoration of 1999.”18 
 
As such, the fact that the government/labour confrontation that concerns us here has 
revolved mainly around fuel prices is not surprising given the increasing poverty 
among a vastly impoverished Nigerian population and the centrality of the price of 
fuel to their survival within this harsh local economy. 
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As might reasonably be expected, these massive fuel price hikes have been as vastly 
unpopular among ordinary Nigerians as they were in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
when the then ruling military juntas implemented similar hikes at the behest of the 
IMF and WB.19 As in that earlier period, the Nigerian labour movement has led the 
current campaign of mass resistance to the implementation of these hikes. The next 
sub-section offers a brief analytical expose of the story of this oppositional struggle. 
 
3.2. Labour-led Mass Resistance 
Charging, a lá Antony Anghie, that the government’s reform program has largely had 
the effect of ‘augmenting inequality and impoverishment among the most vulnerable 
groups”20 a coalition of activist forces that is led by the relatively powerful Nigerian 
Labour Congress (NLC) has fought a sustained and gallant campaign of mass 
resistance against these massive fuel prices increases. This labour-led struggle against 
the harshness in the specific Nigerian context of the market logic of these fuel price 
hikes has mainly taken the form of almost always popular general strikes that have 
often paralysed the economy and always mobilised intense anti-government sentiment 
within the polity. Between 1999 and 2005, at least seven such strikes were called by 
the NLC and supported by a broad array of civil society groups. In a similar vein, one 
campaign of mass rallies and non-strike mass action was also called for. 
 
While nearly all of their acts of resistance were significant, the most significant of the 
seven general strikes that were mounted by this labour-led coalition in opposition to 
fuel price hikes were the June 2000, June 2003, and June 2004 strikes. In response to 
the first increase of fuel prices announced in June 2000 by the Obasanjo government, 
the NLC led one of the most crippling and effective general strikes since the end of 
military rule in Nigeria. Oil workers joined public sector and transportation workers in 
ensuring the success of the strike.21 Nigeria’s main seaport in Lagos and many 
highways were blockaded. International and domestic air flights were disrupted, and 
all fuel stations were closed.22 Sporadic police and protester violence was reported 
across the country and two police stations in the federal capital territory, Abuja, were 
burned down by irate mobs.23 Similarly, after its call for dialogue with the 
government was basically ignored by executive branch (though respected by the 
legislature and supported somewhat by some in the ruling party) the labour-led 
coalition launched another paralysing strike from 30 June 2003 that eventually lasted 
eight days. In the same vein, it took a failed NLC/government dialogue session and 
another three-day strike in June 2004 for the government to reverse that season’s fuel 
price hike.24 All these strikes were relatively effective largely because they enjoyed 
the support of most Nigerians. 
 
The only non-strike mass campaign that this labour-led coalition has conducted took 
place in September 2005. In what can be seen as a tentative and measured response to 
a court ruling that effectively held that the NLC could not organize anti-fuel price 
hike strikes (since such strikes were, in the court’s view, not related to the conditions 
of service of Nigerian workers),25 the labour-led coalition decided to change its tactics 
and called for two weeks of rolling mass rallies to symbolise the resistance of the vast 
majority of the Nigerian people to the government’s sharp fuel price hikes; peaceful 
demonstrations and rallies were held across Nigeria.26 These events were massively 
attended;27 for example, in Lagos, a mammoth crowd was mobilized which at one 
point stretched for nearly 3kms.28 NLC President Adams Oshiomole, the Catholic 
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Archbishop of Lagos Olubunmi Okogie, Nobel prize winner Wole Soyinka and 
Governor Bola Tinubu of Lagos State all supported and addressed this mass rally. 
 
As shown above, the government’s policy of massive fuel price increases 
(deregulation and disinvestment) in an atmosphere of mass grinding poverty met 
strong and sustained resistance from the vast majority of the Nigerian people. And it 
was the labour-led coalition that acted as the vanguard of this resistance campaign. 
Pressured as it was to fit a straight jacket that was largely tailored according to the 
familiar IMF/WB design, the Obasanjo government was predictably determined to 
push through this policy, even while massively alienating most of its citizens. Given 
the intensity of the local resistance to its objectives and the pressure it felt from the 
IMF/WB and other powerful global economic actors, this regime all-too-often 
resorted to tactics that were at best highly undemocratic and at worst brutally 
repressive; this is briefly explained in the next sub section. 
 
3.3. The Obasanjo Regime’s Assault on the Labour-led Coalition and on Labour 
Rights 
Although, it has made some modest concessions as a result of the mass resistance that 
has been mobilised by the labour-led coalition against its series of massive fuel price 
hikes – including partially reversing some of the price hikes29 and declaring a time-
limited moratorium in late 2005 on further hikes30 – the Obasanjo regime’s response 
to the labour-led resistance to the hikes has, for the most part, been far from 
democratic. Indeed, it is better described as largely repressive of labour rights and 
freedoms. 
 
Stung by the vast domestic popularity of the labour-led opposition, and yet under 
great pressure to fit into the IMF/WB straight jacket, the Obasanjo regime has sought 
to defuse the negative effects on its already fragile popular legitimacy of the intense 
labour-led opposition to its fuel price hikes by attempting to limit, contain or stop 
entirely the general strikes that have been called by the labour-led coalition. It has 
made use of public appeals, obtained court rulings, and often ordered – or at least 
largely tolerated – the harassment, assaults, detentions, and killings perpetrated by the 
Nigerian Police Force on labour and allied activists, as well as on ordinary citizen 
protesters. While many examples of the kind of brutal repression that this regime 
resorted to can be offered, two specific ones will serve to illustrate this point. During 
the January 2002 general strike, Adams Oshiomole (the NLC president) and ten other 
union activists was arrested and charged to court with ‘organizing an illegal strike.’31 
Approximately twenty and sixteen NLC leaders were arrested and detained in Kaduna 
and Port Harcourt, respectively.32 The police repeated, and in fact intensified and 
worsened, this same pattern of brutality and repression during the June 2003 general 
strike.33 Over sixteen lives were lost nation-wide at the hands of police officers and 
the police brutally assaulted dozens of others.34 These two stories exemplify the 
Obasanjo regime’s general reaction to the anti-fuel price hike resistance. 
 
In a formally democratic but still repressive manner, the Obasanjo regime has also 
pushed through legislation that seeks to significantly weaken the labour-led 
coalition’s capacity to paralyse economic and social activities in the country and thus 
to reduce the coalition’s ability to force the government to abandon or modify its 
highly unpopular fuel price increases.35 This new legislation amends the Trade 
Unions Act and other allied legislation.36 Under the new Act, labour unions can only 
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declare a strike if their grouse with the government or their employer concerns a 
“dispute of right” (defined as one that arises directly and strictly from a collective 
agreement).37 As such, strikes against fuel price hikes are presumably now outlawed 
under the new Act. Also health, education and other ‘essential workers’ (as defined 
under the Trade Disputes Act38) are now barred from ever declaring a strike.39 Again, 
no labour union can declare a strike unless a simple majority of all union members 
(not simply a majority of those who are present and voting) vote in favour of that 
course of action.40   
 
As anti-Labour this legislation may seem, the original Bill submitted to the National 
Assembly by the Obasanjo regime41 was even more draconian. However, under 
pressure from the labour-led coalition and vocal sections of the Nigerian public, the 
National Assembly watered down significantly that Bill’s much harsher proposals. 
The three major but highly consequential amendments that the National Assembly 
made to the original Bill was to expunge the government’s proposal to ban strikes 
altogether, reduce the number of votes required for a union to declare a strike from a 
two-third to a simple majority, and expunge the mandate imposed on the Registrar of 
Trade Unions to de-register the NLC as the only central labour organization in 
Nigeria.  
 
Overall though, it must be noted that the pattern of right’s curtailment and repression 
that is noticeable from the above account fits seamlessly into a broader picture of 
semi-autocratic rule and generally poor human rights performance under the current 
Obasanjo regime. This disappointing record included a failed campaign to amend the 
Nigerian Constitution so as to allow President Obasanjo to enjoy a third term in 
office.42 Given the fact that the Obasanjo regime has exhibited a broad semi-
autocratic bent, it becomes apparent that the labour-led popular struggle against its 
reform project did not cause or create the autocratic instincts or behaviour of this 
regime. However, the activities of this labour-led resistance to its IMF/WB inspired 
and supported fuel price hikes led to the intensification and accentuation of particular 
forms of government repression targeted at those who launched street protests and 
general strikes against the regime’s highly unpopular policies and actions. It is only 
logical that the regime singled out labour rights and freedoms for curtailment and 
targeted the labour movement for weakening. It had to get tough in this repressive 
manner in order to push the TREMF paradigm firmly through the obstacles erected by 
a predominantly resistant Nigerian population. 
 
3.4. The Western (Non)Reaction: Studied Ignorance or Wilful Acceptance? 
Although the Obasanjo regime is definitely not a ‘bare knuckle’ dictatorship of the 
Abacha kind,43 given its visibly poor human rights record and in the light of Nigeria’s 
very visible stature both in Africa and in international relations, it is difficult to 
understand why this regime has received a relative pass in the international 
community. Why, one can ask, is the Obasanjo regime’s suppression of labour rights 
and labour movements in Nigeria any better or more benign than similar actions in 
Mugabe’s Zimbabwe? Why has US President George Bush claimed in a manner that 
exemplifies the favourable international view of the Obasanjo regime that ‘because of 
[Obasanjo’s] forthrightness and…style and…commitment…I’m honoured to be here 
with you’?44 Why did the then IMF resident representative in Nigeria laud President 
Obasanjo for his ‘efforts to provide a brighter future for all Nigerians.’45 Does this 
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international behaviour signify their studied ignorance or wilful acceptance of the 
crackdown on the labour-led coalition? 
 
One of the most important of many reasons that can be identified for this troubling 
Western/international attitude is that the Obasanjo regime has on the whole been a 
strategic and key economic and political partner of the particular formations of global 
capital that have been most engaged with the Nigerian state, namely the key Western 
interests involved – be they the IMF/WB, the US/British governments, or US/British 
investors. A dimension of this specific reason may be the fact that this regime has 
faithfully implemented the key aspects of the reform agenda favoured by the IMF/WB 
and these key Western governments. Such reforms (especially the complete 
deregulation of the already largely denationalised petroleum sector) have or will likely 
partly ensure benefit to many Western corporations, bankers, traders, investors, and 
even citizens. These actors often benefit tremendously from increased access to local 
markets, the sale of local refineries, and increases in the prices of fuel sold locally by 
the oil marketing multinationals. 
 
The above evidence shows that substantive elements influenced the steady shift 
toward the TREMF paradigm and organised the Nigerian Government’s thinking in 
their dogged implementation over time of a highly unpopular set of massive fuel price 
hikes. They also shaped the regime’s desperately harsh reaction to the labour-led mass 
resistance to those hikes; and the evidence explains in significant measure the 
seeming international acceptance (or at least tolerance) of the supposedly democratic 
Obasanjo regime’s repression of labour rights and movements.   
 
4. Assessing the Baxian TREMF Thesis 
The focus of this section is to provide an analytical assessment of the possible 
explanatory power of the TREMF thesis in relation to the evidence that was discussed 
in the preceding section regarding the character of the government/labour 
confrontations over a key aspect of the government’s reform program, and the 
seeming studied ignorance or acceptance of the government’s repressive behaviour by 
the international community.  This evaluation will be conducted in the first instance 
through a consideration of each of the four sub-claims of the TREMF thesis that were 
isolated and discussed briefly in section two above. Following this discussion a few 
other related insights will be offered. 
 
Sub-Claim one of the TREMF thesis which posits that the emergent TREMF 
paradigm protects the collective human rights of “global capital” at the expense of 
human beings is in my own view proven to some extent by the discussion in section 
three. To the extent that the praxis of the Obasanjo regime has gone to great lengths 
and taken serious political legitimacy risks in order to assign important property rights 
to elements of global capital (through the relative deregulation and denationalisation 
of the petroleum sector), its behaviour seems to support this particular sub-claim to a 
large extent. But I do reserve judgement for now as to the wisdom or otherwise of 
referring to the kind of entrenchment of property rights in favour of global capital that 
is being witnessed in the Nigerian context as the assignment of “human” as opposed 
to ordinary “legal” rights. I do agree with Baxi that since many others have long 
appropriated the language of rights to the benefit of differing formations of global 
capital, the genie is already out of the discursive bottle. But to what extent must we 
re-inscribe this discursive move? Is a refusal to name these TREMF rights “human” in 
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any sense an act of resistance? Of course, Baxi’s thesis is at one level only descriptive 
as to the reality of the on-going paradigmatic shift toward TREMF. It is, in that 
descriptive sense, unassailable in my own view. 
 
Sub-claim two insists that the emergent TREMF paradigm requires the (mostly Third 
World) states that want to earn a “progressive” label to become good hosts (or – a lá 
Baxi – good hostages) to the particular formations of global capital with which these 
states are engaged. This sub-claim is in my view proven by the discussion in section 
three. To the extent that the Obasanjo regime has gone to great lengths since 1999 to 
severely constrain labour rights in Nigeria and weaken Nigerian labour movements so 
as to make the country more hospitable to particular formations of global capital (such 
as the much sought after foreign investors), including via a single minded pursuit of 
its massive fuel price hike policies in the face of massive disenchantment and 
resistance, there is proof positive of the explanatory power of Baxi’s TREMF thesis in 
this Nigerian context. The Obasanjo regime has sought to make Nigeria more 
hospitable to these elements of global capital by encouraging them to acquire very 
valuable property rights in the increasingly deregulated petroleum industry, 
undertaking massive fuel price hikes to ensure that these property rights in the 
petroleum industry become even more valuable as a result of the increased profits that 
accrue from investing in them, and seeking to ban, or at least tame, the general strikes 
and labour movements that in the government’s view creates the kind of political 
instability that makes global capital averse to investing in the country. The regime has 
also sought to make the Nigerian state much more soft than hard toward the IMF/WB 
by faithfully adopting most of their demands for reform and being commended for so 
doing by these bodies, while all the while conveniently pretending that its key socio-
economic reform policies are ‘home grown.’46  
 
As we have seen already, sub-claim three posits that the emergent TREMF paradigm 
in effect constructs the ideal (Third World) state as one that effectively implements the 
usually unpopular IMF/WB-style reform policies, and if necessary uses undemocratic, 
rough, or even repressive tactics that overwhelm the frequent popular resistance to 
these policies. These are the kinds of states that often attract IMF/WB 
commendations.47 This sub-claim is clearly supported by the evidence from Nigeria 
that is discussed in this paper. As shown in section three, the Obasanjo regime has 
repeatedly and doggedly buried its fangs into the flesh of the coalition that has led the 
mass resistance to its massive fuel price hikes. And as we have also seen, this has 
earned this regime the thinly veiled commendations (or at the very least, the 
acquiescence) of various elements of global capital and their key promoters. 
 
Sub-claim four, which argues that the emergent TREMF paradigm denies a significant 
redistributive role to the (Third World) state while favouring more and more 
disinvestment and denationalisation on the part of states is also demonstrated by the 
evidence discussed in section three. In doggedly implementing its fuel price hike 
policy and justifying it as its attempt to remove and gradually end the policy of 
subsidizing the cost of fuel to an already vastly impoverished Nigerian public, the 
Obasanjo regime accepts this aspect of the TREMF paradigm almost lock, stock and 
barrel. Thus, in my own view, the ‘living law’ of human rights (rooted as it must be in 
empirical evidence of social struggle/repression, social experience/propaganda, and 
thus of socio-legalities and counter-legalities) essentially grounds and supports Baxi’s 
overall TREMF thesis. The Nigerian government’s repressive behaviour, the studied 
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silence or acquiescence of many in the West who know or ought to know about this 
regime’s excesses in defence of its TREMF-style organising ideology, and the fact of 
this regime’s very public and all-too-frequent endorsements by key elements and 
promoters of global capital lends much credence to Baxi’s germinal insight into the 
TREMF paradigm’s rapid concretisation in our time as the dominant official frame of 
reference, even in the context of human rights questions.  
 
It can of course be argued with much justification that the kind of solid paradigmatic 
shift toward TREMF that is observable within Nigeria is more present at the official 
level than at the level of mass social movements or popular civil society actors (such 
as many elements within the Nigerian labour-led coalition). This case study itself 
shows a solid movement in a direction other than the official one; one that challenges 
and rejects the dominant shift toward TREMF and offers a solid, if non-dominant, 
subaltern counter-normativity that can under certain conditions constrain the 
dominant TREMF norm to a modest extent (as witness Obasanjo’s frequent modest 
retreats in the face of mass action by the labour-led coalition in Nigeria). Baxi is of 
course aware of the value of what he himself describes in another context as 
‘switching perspectives’48 and does anticipate this issue when he asks whether:  
 
‘…there [are] any more possible ways of social and political struggle that 
may still ambush, both through the (Gramscian) wars of manoeuvre and 
position, the ‘cunning’ of late capital? How may the new [and old?] social 
movements (say the feminists and ecological) hunt and haunt the habitats 
of global capital?’49 
 
However, it must be understood that as Baxi has suggested, the official (TREMF-
loving and TREMF-dominated) discourse does not operate merely and only at the 
official level, but also breaches the boundaries of the unofficial and the popular in a 
manner that too often limits the terms of the unofficial anti-reform struggle itself. 
Baxi captures this point when he claimed toward the end of The Future of Human 
Rights that even the social movements that oppose and resist the turn toward TREMF 
orthodoxy are themselves doing so on terms set by the official discourse. And what is 
more, as Baxi himself has suggested, it is the official TREMF discourse and practice 
that has largely constituted and constrained the lived experiences of the Third World 
subaltern (witness how the Obasanjo regime’s retreats without real surrender and its 
steady comebacks toward an effective 250 percent fuel price hike over five years or 
so). 
  
It can also be argued that at no time has the UDH paradigm been fully activated; and 
that the UDH has always contained within it a counter-tendency that is consistent 
with the TREMF paradigm. I do agree with Baxi that the difference between this 
counter tendency within the UDH and the TREMF paradigm is a question of scale 
and intensity, and thus of character. In his words, ‘while the appropriation of human 
rights logic and rhetoric [that is signified by the emergence of the TREMF paradigm] 
is not a distinctively novel phenomenon, it is the scale of reversal now entailed that 
marks a radical discontinuity.’50 It appears then that in one sense, the TREMF human 
rights paradigm is an intense variant of earlier human rights paradigms. It shares 
continuities from the UDH era – though not necessarily with the UDH itself – but the 
discontinuities between them are so many, so enormous, and so intense as to signal 
the emergence of a new paradigm. Since the UDH paradigm did at one time occupy 
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far more dominant a place in the imaginary of most governments and social actors 
than it does today, it is to the gradual but already substantial loss of that dominant 
position and its many negative implications for human rights that Baxi’s germinal 
work in this area has thankfully alerted us. 
 
In one sense, one of the things that the present paper has attempted to do is to provide 
further empirical grounding for the somewhat distant possibility of a counter-
narrative and counter-normativity, while at the same time recognising that, for now, 
little ground exists for optimism regarding the re-emergence to dominance (not to 
mere competitive existence) of the UDH paradigm; at least not in the official 
discourse of the more influential Western governments and of the relevant 
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